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PROSECUTORS AND THEIR STATE AND 
LOCAL POLITIES 
RONALD F. WRIGHT* 
Prosecutors routinely decline to file charges in individual cases; 
sometimes they also announce general policies about declinations that apply 
prospectively to entire categories of cases. The legitimacy of these 
categorical declination policies is in dispute. Current accounts of 
declinations rely on arguments about the traditional activities of prosecutors 
and the distinction between executive and legislative functions in 
constitutional separation of powers doctrine. This Article argues that chief 
prosecutors in state court systems hold competing loyalties to statewide 
voters and local voters. These duties to state and local polities should also 
influence the declination policies that a prosecutor adopts. 
Duties to statewide voters derive from the fact that state legislatures 
create the criminal codes that prosecutors enforce. State government also 
funds some of the work of local prosecutors, but that funding is not sufficient 
to allow full enforcement of the criminal law. The state-level polity, therefore, 
empowers the local prosecutor to allocate scarce resources and to decline 
charges—even for entire categories of cases—as a means of promoting 
public safety that matches local conditions. Local prosecutors can meet their 
obligations to the statewide polity by framing their policies as rebuttable 
presumptions against filing charges and by justifying those policies as a 
reallocation of limited resources. 
Duties to the local polity can add further legitimacy to a prosecutor’s 
declination policy. Local views about the relative importance of crime should 
matter, particularly in circumstances where local governments fund aspects 
of court operations, the effects of crime and law enforcement are 
concentrated locally, and state law grants autonomy to the local prosecutor. 
 
 
 * Needham Y. Gulley Professor of Criminal Law, Wake Forest University. I am grateful 
to Meredith Martin Rountree, Maybell Romero, Rebecca Roiphe, Destiny Peery, Dana Aurelie 
Ouss, Dana Mulhauser, Christopher Lewis, Kay Levine, Russell Gold, Stephen Galoob, 
Daniel Fryer, Chad Flanders, Brittany Deitch, Vincent Chiao, and Jeffrey Bellin for their 
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INTRODUCTION 
Prosecutors dominate the decision not to file criminal charges. Lately, 
it seems, prosecutors in some jurisdictions talk more openly and categorically 
about this power. Rather than deciding quietly to decline charges in a 
particular case, they announce publicly that going forward their office plans 
to decline certain types of cases across the board.1 Such categorical 
declinations might extend to selected criminal statutes, such as marijuana 
possession, or might extend to groups of defendants, such as juveniles or 
homeless people, who face designated charges.2 
These categorical declination policies differ from more familiar uses of 
the declination power for two reasons. First, they are publicly announced, 
and, second, they are not justified on the basis of facts in the particular case. 
Prosecutors traditionally refuse to file charges in individual cases for various 
reasons. Sometimes it is because of a lack of evidence, sometimes it is to 
shift limited resources to other potential cases, and sometimes it is because a 
criminal prosecution would not produce justice or public safety in the 
 
 1 See infra Part I. 
 2 See RACHEL ROLLINS, THE RACHAEL ROLLINS POLICY MEMO, AT D-1 (2019), http://files.
suffolkdistrictattorney.com/The-Rachael-Rollins-Policy-Memo.pdf [perma.cc/26sq-d83b] 
(describing policy of presumed refusal to charge for fifteen offenses, including marijuana, 
shoplifting, and trespass); John E. Foster, Charges to Be Declined: Legal Challenges and 
Policy Debates Surrounding Non-Prosecution Initiatives in Massachusetts, 60 B.C. L. REV. 
2511, 2512 (2019) (identifying 15 minor offenses covered by declination policy of 
Commonwealth’s Attorney office in Boston); Charles W. Thomas & W. Anthony Fitch, 
Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 507, 518–21 (1976). 
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particular case.3 These decisions, however, are typically not announced to the 
public, and they do not ordinarily apply prospectively to entire categories of 
cases. 
Legislatures and judges in the United States do not typically enforce 
limits on the prosecutor’s discretion to decline charges.4 Nevertheless, a 
prosecutor’s declination policy is a matter of debate within the prosecutor’s 
office, among other lawyers, and with the larger voting public.5 Within this 
arena of public debate, prosecutors’ announcements about their declination 
plans have prompted controversy about where to place those limits and when 
those declinations should be deemed legitimate or illegitimate.6 
One approach to this question—one might call it the “leniency 
option”—validates prosecutorial leniency in almost every form. With the 
possible exception of declinations motivated by invidious discrimination or 
personal gain, this approach holds that the prosecutor may refuse to initiate 
charges against any individual or in any class of cases, so long as the refusal 
is based on an appeal to the common good. Under this view, no other 
governmental actor may properly compel the prosecutor to pursue a criminal 
case.7 
Another school of thought—one might call it the “individuals-only 
option”—draws a line between case-by-case declinations (which are seen as 
 
 3 See Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMPLE POL. & C.R. L. 
REV. 369, 371–73 (2010) (arguing that prosecutorial discretion is necessary to make criminal 
law track ordinary local morality). 
 4 See Darryl Brown, The Judicial Role in Criminal Charging and Plea Bargaining, 46 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 63, 63 (2017) (noting that “scope of judicial authority is quite limited” as to 
prosecutor’s choice of charges). 
 5 See Kelsy Schlotthauer, City Mulls Charges Against Tulsa BLM Activists After DA 
Declines to Prosecute Some Painters, TULSA WORLD ( (Oct. 21, 2020), https://tulsaworld.com
/news/local/district-attorney-declines-to-file-charges-against-blm-activists-city-now-
reviewing-charges/article_fde56b9a-131b-11eb-80ff-175db44565ab.html 
[https://perma.cc/7NCP-TWU6]; cf. Ronald F. Wright, Kami Chavis, & Gregory S. Parks, The 
Jury Sunshine Project: Jury Selection Data as a Political Issue, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1407, 
1423 (proposing use of data to promote public debate about jury selection practices of 
prosecutors). 
 6 See infra Part II. 
 7 See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1250–
52 (2011) (describing bounds of appropriate non-evidentiary grounds for prosecutors to 
decline charges under a “complete discretion” view); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, A 
Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 805, 838–40 (2020) (describing the view 
that prosecutors may appropriately refuse to enforce the law in categories of cases); David 
Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of the Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 473, 505, 507-08 (2016) (arguing that prosecutors necessarily mediate between 
law and irreducible discretion as they determine which criminal cases to pursue). For 
additional examples, see infra Part II. 
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acceptable) and categorical decisions to decline charges (which are not).8 For 
this camp, any declinations that apply to entire categories of criminal charges 
or criminal defendants are improper uses of prosecutorial discretion. 
These two familiar accounts of the outer bounds of the prosecutor’s 
declination power are both grounded in the separation of powers theory, 
despite the different outcomes they advocate. According to this theory, a 
declination is legitimate when it remains an exercise of prosecutorial power, 
as defined in historical and constitutional terms.9 When a prosecutor 
encroaches on the work of the legislature by effectively decriminalizing 
entire categories of conduct that are punishable in the criminal code, the 
declination is illegitimate. Thus, according to this view, the essence of the 
prosecutor’s role defines the boundaries of the declination power.10 The 
individuals-only option and the leniency option simply disagree about how 
to describe the essence of the prosecutor’s role. 
In this Article, I argue that not all limits on the declination power of 
state and local prosecutors in the United States derive from a separation of 
powers theory or from any single account of the essential nature of the 
prosecutor’s job. Instead, proper limits on the prosecutor’s declination power 
should also account for the division of authority between levels of 
government: federal versus state and state versus local governmental 
authority. Viewing prosecutor declination policies from this vantage point 
takes into account the importance of diverse structures and practices among 
different prosecutors’ offices. 
The different levels of government matter because prosecutors answer 
to a different electorate—a different polity—at each level. Although federal 
prosecutors enforce the criminal laws of the national government on behalf 
of a national polity,11 most state prosecutors straddle two different polities. 
 
 8 See, e.g., William P. Barr, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Grand Lodge Fraternal Order 
of Police’s 64th National Biennial Conference (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.justice.gov
/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-remarks-grand-lodge-fraternal-order-
polices-64th [perma.cc/3xka-z63h] (criticizing some anti-law enforcement DAs for 
“announcing their refusal to enforce broad swathes of the criminal law”). 
 9 See infra Part II. 
 10 See Logan Sawyer, Reform Prosecutors and Separation of Powers, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 
603, 608–09 (2020) (arguing that prosecutor declination policies can be squared with 
traditional prosecutor functions as defined in separation of powers concepts, properly 
understood). 
 11 See L. B. Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors’ Discretion, 13 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 64, 87 (1948) (advocating declinations by federal prosecutors under a 
“general policy of remitting local offenders to local authorities”); Michael A. Simons, 
Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling 
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They enforce the criminal laws enacted by the representatives of a statewide 
electorate and, at the same time, they must also account for the current 
enforcement priorities of the local county residents who elected them to 
office. Prosecutors answer, at least in part, to those local residents who most 
immediately feel the effects of their work to promote public safety.12 
Although individual case declinations fit easily with the prosecutor’s 
duty to a statewide polity, categorical declinations require more careful 
explanations from the prosecutor.13 It is easiest to justify declination policies 
as presumptions—that is, a general office practice of refusing to charge—
while leaving open the possibility of a prosecution under exceptional 
circumstances. These presumptions can be founded on the prosecutor’s 
judgment about where to spend limited resources. 
Further, when local residents favor non-enforcement of particular 
criminal laws, their voice adds greater legitimacy to the prosecutor’s 
declination policy. It is appropriate for voters in the district to influence the 
local prosecutor’s priorities in pursuing one type of criminal case when 
compared to others.14  
Some local input matters more than others. For instance, some legal 
environments strengthen the prosecutor’s duties to the local polity when they 
rely on local governments to fund aspects of criminal enforcement or when 
they grant legal autonomy to local officials.15 In such a locally oriented legal 
framework, a prosecutor might go beyond mere presumptive declinations. 
Categorical declinations might be appropriate in that local setting to block 
the use of state statutes that fall outside the core provisions of the criminal 
code. A clear-cut rule against prosecution under these statutes can serve the 
customized public safety needs of the locality and reflect the current 
 
Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 930–36 (2000); see generally Jonathan H. Adler, Our 
Federalism on Drugs, in MARIJUANA FEDERALISM: UNCLE SAM AND MARY JANE (Jonathan H. 
Adler ed., 2020) (describing distinctive roles for federal and state enforcement of marijuana 
laws). 
 12 The jumble of names that apply to prosecutors in the United States embody the 
conflicting loyalties between state and local polities. They are known, in various places, as 
“State’s Attorneys,” “County Attorneys,” “District Attorneys,” “Prosecuting Attorneys,” 
“Circuit Solicitors,” and many other titles. While many prosecutors are selected by voters in 
a single county, there are also local prosecutorial districts comprised of several counties. See 
Carissa Byrne Hessick & Michael Morse, Picking Prosecutors, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1537, 1549 
(2020). 
 13 See infra Part III.B. 
 14 For an insightful discussion of the political theory implications of prosecutor 
declination policies created in response to voter preferences, see generally W. Kerrel Murray, 
Populist Prosecutorial Nullification, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3542575. 
 15 See infra Part IV.B. 
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enforcement priorities of the local voters. Further, a clear announcement of 
such a rule promotes better accountability of the prosecutor to the public. 
Ultimately, this framework of competing polities can accommodate 
both those prosecutors who limit their declinations to individual cases and—
in the proper circumstances—prosecutors who make declinations 
categorically. Prosecutors who decline charges on either basis can fulfill their 
duties to both sets of voters. 
Part II of this Article offers examples of prosecutors’ categorical 
declination policies, emphasizing that prosecutors who hold differing 
political views have invoked similarly broad declination authority. Part III 
describes the influence of separation of powers concepts in some familiar 
accounts of declinations. Part IV then explores the prosecutor’s duties to a 
statewide polity and explains the importance of linking declination policies 
to resource allocation in that context. Part V turns to the prosecutor’s duties 
to a local polity and elaborates how those duties can reinforce the legitimacy 
of most declination policies. In the end, this Article concludes that these 
competing loyalties are compatible, and it is possible for prosecutors to 
answer to both state and local constituencies. 
I. CATEGORICAL DECLINATION POLICIES 
The prosecutor’s power to decline charges that the police recommend 
to them is centrally relevant to current debates about criminal justice reform. 
New declination policies form just one part of a larger suite of changes to the 
prosecutor’s role that is now taking hold in some places. This different 
understanding of the job—described in some circles as progressive or reform 
prosecution—looks beyond the outcomes obtained in the criminal courts as 
a measure of success. These prosecutors aim to promote public safety 
through closer partnerships with the community, while shrinking the reach 
of the criminal courts and prisons.16 This changed vision of the job affects 
the way that prosecutors’ offices approach many tasks, including diversion 
programs, pretrial release, conviction integrity review, sentence severity 
review, reentry programs, and more.17 But the charging practices of an office 
should appear near the top of any reformer’s list. The mix of charges and 
declinations can reshape public safety at the local level more profoundly—
 
 16 See EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN 
PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION 149–68, 196–220 (2019) (describing 
partnerships between Brooklyn District Attorney and community groups). 
 17 See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Reimagining Prosecution: A Growing Progressive 
Movement, 3 UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 1, 22 (2019); Benjamin Levin, Imagining the 
Progressive Prosecutor, 105 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 11), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3542792. 
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and with less need for cooperation from other actors—than any other 
component of the prosecutor’s work.18 
This Part places into context the typical practices American prosecutors 
employ when they decline charges in individual cases. Then it collects some 
recent examples of prosecutor office policies that call for declinations for 
entire categories of cases. 
A. CASE-LEVEL DECLINATIONS 
The decision of an individual prosecutor to decline charges in a single 
case is unremarkable, both in the United States and elsewhere.19 Legal 
traditions around the world empower prosecutors to decline charges when 
they believe that the evidence does not support criminal proceedings. 
Prosecutors in some countries, such as Germany, operate within a tradition 
of “compulsory prosecution,” which calls for the prosecutor to file charges 
whenever the government assembles sufficient evidence to support those 
charges.20 The flip side of that duty means that the prosecutor must decline 
to file charges when there is insufficient proof. 
Prosecutors in other systems, such as those in the Netherlands, function 
within a tradition of the “opportunity principle,” which allows the prosecutor 
to decline charges in opportune cases. Put another way, prosecutors may 
decline to file charges to direct limited resources to other cases or to 
recognize the defendant’s lack of dangerousness.21 
 
 18 See Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 180–81 (2019) 
(arguing that core of prosecutor power is their authority to select charges). 
 19 See JÖRG-MARTIN JEHLE & MARIANNE WADE, COPING WITH OVERLOADED CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEMS: THE RISE OF PROSECUTORIAL POWER ACROSS EUROPE 21 (2006) (examining 
increased use of declinations in several national court systems in Europe); Newman F. Baker, 
The Prosecutor--Initiation of Prosecution, 23 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 770, 776-86 (1933) 
(reviewing typical day of declination and charging decisions of an individual prosecutor). 
 20 See Joachim Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of 
Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 468, 469–70 (1974). 
 21 See Victoria Colvin, The Riddle of Prosecutorial Discretion, in THE EVOLVING ROLE OF 
THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR 139, 140–42 (Victoria Colvin and Philip Stenning eds., 2019); Henk 
van de Bunt & Jean-Louis van Gelder, The Dutch Prosecution Service, 41 CRIME AND JUSTICE 
117, 123–25 (2012). High volumes of incoming criminal cases tend to increase the 
prosecutor’s power to weed out some cases within either of these traditions. See JEHLE & 
WADE, supra note 19, at 8–10. Similarly, the bureaucratic structures of prosecutor services in 
various countries set the proper limits of declinations in those places. Senior prosecutors in 
some countries conduct formal reviews of declinations, sometimes at the request of the victim 
of an alleged crime. Such a review structure creates an institutional home where prosecutors 
can develop criteria for sound declination choices. See DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE 
WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN 128–32 (2001); Michael Jasch, Prosecution 
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The “opportunity principle” is the better description of charge selection 
in the United States. Prosecutors across the United States share a similar 
reasoning process to the countries that employ this principle as they consider 
whether to file or decline charges. As field studies reveal, prosecutors ask 
two distinct questions during the charging process.22 First is the issue of 
evidentiary sufficiency: is there enough evidence to prove each element of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt? Second comes the question of 
proportionality: does this case make wise use of the limited resources of this 
office and the criminal courts? Would a criminal prosecution do justice for 
the victim, the defendant, and the entire community when compared to other 
forms of accountability?23 This two-step process for evaluating possible 
charges is common practice for U.S. prosecutors. 
B. THE ARRIVAL OF CATEGORICAL DECLINATIONS 
This consensus breaks down, however, when the topic moves from 
declinations in individual cases to broader categorical declination policies. 
 
and Politics in Germany: The Struggle for Independence, in THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE 
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, supra note 21, at 205, 206–07; Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial 
Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from Current White Collar Cases and the 
Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 194–97 (2004). Judges in some legal systems 
have the authority to review some prosecutorial decisions to decline criminal charges. See R 
(on the Application of Peter Dennis) v. DPP, [2006] EWHC 3211 (Admin). 
 22 See FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A 
CRIME 151–53 (1969) (listing typical reasons that prosecutors invoke for declinations, 
including evidentiary strength and factors related to proportionality of criminal charges); John 
Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion—A Comment, 60 NW. U. L. REV. 174, 178, 187 (1965) 
(describing evidentiary and non-evidentiary reasons for refusal to prosecute, based on field 
observations). Although prosecutors follow a familiar evaluation process during the 
declination decision making process, they tend not to record or publicize their reasoning. See 
Jessica A. Roth, Prosecutorial Declination Statements, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 477, 
531–36 (2020) (reviewing exceptional practices of prosecutors who issue statements 
explaining declinations in select cases and proposing criteria for more common usage of public 
statements). 
 23 See Green & Roiphe, supra note 7 at 808–12 (describing reasons for charging decision 
grounded in public good rather than private gain); BRUCE FREDERICK & DON STEMEN, THE 
ANATOMY OF DISCRETION: AN ANALYSIS OF PROSECUTORIAL DECISION MAKING 3–5 (2012), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/240335.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7CL-M72M]; 
David W. Neubauer, After the Arrest: The Charging Decision in Prairie City, 8 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 495, 503–04 (1974). For a rare legislative effort to codify this line of reasoning, see 
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.411(1) (2020). Standards published by professional prosecutor 
associations describe the reasoning process in similar terms. See NATIONAL PROSECUTION 
STANDARDS §§ 4-1.1–4-2.4 (NAT’L DISTRICT ATT’YS ASS’N 2009); CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION §§ 3-4.3–3-4.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
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Such policies have existed for decades.24 Prosecutors have, until recently, 
been reluctant to release or publicize the policies they created for purposes 
of internal guidance and consistency.25 The decision to keep these policies 
hidden spurred debates about transparency and public access to the policies’ 
terms.26 
Recently, in response to the changing politics of crime in the United 
States,27 more prosecutors have gone public with their declination policies. 
Sometimes their policies have appeared in election campaigns as candidates 
for the chief prosecutor’s office vow not to file any charges for specific types 
of crimes. Consider first the chief prosecutors who campaigned in local 
elections on the promise to decline most or all charges for possession of small 
amounts of marijuana.28 Others announced that they would stop filing 
criminal charges for jumping turnstiles to ride local subways without paying 
a fare.29 Some prosecutors have declined to prosecute charges based on 
 
 24 See Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing “Discretionary 
Justice,” 13 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 170–75 (2004) (describing provisions of U.S. 
Attorneys’ Manual, including those that “provide guidance in a wide array of areas such as 
charging”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ WRITTEN GUIDELINES FOR THE 
DECLINATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS: A REPORT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONGRESS (1979); Norman Abrams, Prosecutorial Charge Decision Systems, 
23 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4–11 (1975) (describing three exemplary charging policies); John A. 
Lundquist, Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion—A Re-Evaluation of the Prosecutor’s 
Unbridled Discretion and Its Potential for Abuse, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 485, 493–94 (1972). 
 25 See Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 25–34 (1971). 
 26 See Leland E. Beck, The Administrative Law of Criminal Prosecution: The 
Development of Prosecutorial Policy, 27 AM. U. L. REV. 310, 345–58 (1978). 
 27 In particular, public opinion in some jurisdictions over the last few years has made it 
viable for prosecutors and police to address mass incarceration and racial disparities in law 
enforcement. See generally Lauren M. Ouziel, Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Criminal 
Justice Reform, 61 B.C. L. REV. 523 (2020) (discussing democratic responsiveness and 
systemic legitimacy in criminal legal systems during an era of transition to less emphasis on 
prison usage and greater concern over racial disparities). 
 28 E.g., Jessica Miller, Utah County’s Top Prosecutor is Moving Away from Drug Cases 
— but Not Everyone is on Board, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Nov. 29, 2019), https://www.sltrib.com/
news/2019/11/29/utah-countys-top/ [https://perma.cc/QJP7-FFK6]; Stephanie Clifford & 
Joseph Goldstein, Brooklyn Prosecutor Limits When He’ll Target Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 
8, 2014) https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/nyregion/brooklyn-district-attorney-to-stop-
prosecuting-low-level-marijuana-cases.html; Shaila Dewan, A Growing Chorus of Big City 
Prosecutors Say No to Marijuana Convictions, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.nyt
imes.com/2019/01/29/us/baltimore-marijuana-possession.html [perma.cc/7sjx-mjra]. 
 29 E.g., James C. McKinley Jr, For Manhattan Fare Beaters, One-Way Ticket to Court 
May Be Over, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/nyregion/
subway-fare-beating-new-york.html [perma.cc/7a5j-lybk]; ROLLINS, supra note 2 (describing 
policy of presumed refusal to charge for fifteen offenses, including marijuana, shoplifting, and 
trespass). 
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violations of social-distancing laws designed to prevent the spread of the 
COVID-19 pandemic.30 
In a related maneuver, prosecutors sometimes announce a policy to 
replace a more serious crime with a lesser charge as a routine matter. For 
instance, offices have declared that they will stop filing felony charges for 
retail theft below a designated dollar value, treating those cases as 
misdemeanors instead.31 Similarly, some prosecutors declare that they will 
not request the death penalty in murder cases.32 
Contrary to what one might expect, these categorical declination 
policies do not all come from prosecutors associated with the political left.33 
Switching the political valence, one Tennessee prosecutor announced to 
participants at a Bible conference in 2018 that he would not enforce state 
laws against domestic partner violence in cases involving same-sex couples. 
He explained this policy as a routine exercise of prosecutorial discretion: 
prosecutors “can choose not to prosecute anything . . . . [T]he social 
 
 30 E.g., Rebecca Rosenberg, NYC DAs Won’t Prosecute Most Social Distancing-Related 
Arrests, N.Y. POST (May 12, 2020, 8:54 PM), https://nypost.com/2020/05/12/nyc-das-wont-
prosecute-most-social-distancing-related-arrests [perma.cc/8qlu-tbnl]. Similarly, some 
prosecutors have declared that they would not file charges in cases involving peaceful curfew 
violations during protests against police brutality in the wake of George Floyd’s murder in 
Minneapolis. See Molly Crane-Newman, Manhattan DA Won’t Prosecute Protesters Amid 
Mass NYC Arrests, Commends New Yorkers Exercising Civil Rights at George Floyd 
Demonstrations, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 5, 2020), https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/
manhattan/ny-cy-vance-will-not-prosecute-protesters-20200605-
koon5gsfjfc5hczw7xdtnt4gci-story.html [perma.cc/2ppe-7aya]. 
 31 E.g., Steve Schmadeke, Top Cook County Prosecutor Raising Bar for Charging 
Shoplifters with Felony, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news
/breaking/ct-kim-foxx-retail-theft-1215-20161214-story.html [https://perma.cc/3TP4-
7XNZ]. 
 32 Miriam Aroni Krinsky & Jody E. Owens, Unlikely Supporters of Ending the Death 
Penalty in Pa. and Beyond? Prosecutors, PHILA. INQUIRER (Oct. 7, 2019, 10:17 AM), 
https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/commentary/pennsylvania-death-penalty-supreme-court-
20191007.html. 
 33 Prosecutors affiliated with the Republican Party have adopted declination policies in 
several offices, including Jacksonville, Florida and San Joaquin, California. See Andrew 
Pantazi, State Attorney Promised to Reform the Office. Six Months Later, Has She Delivered?, 
FLA. TIMES-UNION (Jun. 29, 2017), https://www.jacksonville.com/news/metro/public-safety/
2017-06-29/state-attorney-promised-reform-office-six-months-later-has-she  
[https://perma.cc/2M5B-JNEL]; Evan Sernoffsky, Central California DA Quits State 
Association Over Its Opposition to Criminal Justice Reforms, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 16, 2020), 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/Central-California-DA-quits-state-association-
14981879.php[https://perma.cc/QP6X-GXUY]. 
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engineers on the Supreme Court now decided we have homosexual marriage. 
I disagree with them.”34  
A different type of declination policy aims for effects beyond the 
boundaries of the local district. Prosecutors sometimes announce their 
policies in an effort to influence state legislators, signaling their support for 
changes to the current criminal statutes. For instance, a number of 
prosecutors have highlighted their charging policies related to low-level drug 
crimes during legislative debates about possible amendments to those laws.35 
From time to time, prosecutors even announce anticipatory declinations, 
stating they do not plan to enforce proposed laws in the future. They 
announce these policies while legislators debate the bills’ merits. For 
instance, some prosecutors in Virginia and elsewhere declared their counties 
to be “Second Amendment Sanctuaries.”36 They said their offices would not 
file criminal charges under proposed gun control laws being debated in their 
state legislatures because, in their view, the bills violated the constitutional 
right to bear arms and made local residents feel less secure.37 From a different 
political vantage point, prosecutors have also declared that they would not 
enforce any proposed criminal statutes that would punish women who obtain 
an abortion after six weeks of pregnancy.38 Those laws, in the view of the 
prosecutors, violated the constitutional rights of women to access these 
health services.39 
 
 34 Deanna Paul, This ‘Good Christian’ Prosecutor is Overlooking Domestic Violence 
Charges for Same-Sex Couples, WASH. POST (Jun. 5, 2019, 3:35 PM), https://www.washingto
npost.com/nation/2019/06/05/this-good-christian-prosecutor-is-overlooking-domestic-
violence-charges-same-sex-couples [https://perma.cc/PN8K-6U6C]; see Sam Kamin, 
Prosecutorial Discretion in the Context of Immigration and Marijuana Law Reform: The 
Search for a Limiting Principle, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 183, 184 (2016) (arguing that a 
prosecutor who announced a policy never to prosecute domestic violence charges would not 
be viewed as a legitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion). 
 35 See Justin Jouvenal & Rachel Weiner, Prosecutors Won’t Pursue Marijuana Possession 




 36 See In Virginia and Elsewhere, 2nd Amendment “Sanctuary” Movement Aims to Defy 
New Gun Laws, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2019 1:33 PM) https://www.latimes.com/world-
nation/story/2019-12-21/second-amendment-sanctuary-push-aims-to-defy-new-gun-laws. 
 37 Id.; Shawn E. Fields, Second Amendment Sanctuaries, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 496–
97 (2020). 
 38 Isaac Stanley-Becker, ‘A Responsibility to Say No’: Prosecutors Vow Not to Bring 
Charges under Severe Abortion Laws, WASH. POST (May 21, 2019, 5:36 PM) https://www.
washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/05/21/georgia-prosecutors-wont-enforce-abortion-ban-
sim-gill-utah [https://perma.cc/V4ME-TGN8]. 
 39 Id. 
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II. POTENTIAL LIMITS ON DECLINATION POLICIES 
In legal systems across the United States, limits on the prosecutor’s 
categorical declinations are generally not found in federal or state 
constitutional doctrine or statutes.40 Legislatures and judges remain mostly 
silent on the declination of charges, whether for individual defendants or for 
entire categories.41 A local chief prosecutor can control the declination 
choices of her line prosecutors,42 and one generally cannot appeal the 
decision.43 
Instead of formal review mechanisms within the legal system, local 
prosecutors in the United States face political accountability for their 
declinations.44 When they announce their declination policies, prosecutors 
spark a debate among other actors within the local criminal courts about the 
wisdom and legitimacy of their choices—a debate that does not happen when 
line prosecutors issue individual declinations without explanation.45 Chief 
prosecutors also face scrutiny from other prosecutors and attorneys 
throughout the state and beyond.46 Local prosecutors often respond to 
 
 40 While judges in a few cases have blocked prosecutors from declaring general and 
prospective rules about granting access to diversion programs, those rulings are based on 
specific language in the rules and statutes that establish those programs. See State v. Baynes, 
690 A.2d 594, 597–600 (N.J. 1997) (preventing prosecutor from implementing categorical 
ban on defendant eligibility for judicially-created pretrial diversion program). 
 41 See MILLER, supra note 22, at 154–59. 
 42 Line prosecutors are the attorneys in the office who deal with individual case-level 
questions and carry out the policies of the elected chief prosecutor. 
 43 See Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of 
Sovereignty, and the Limits of Law, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 398 (2008). In other countries, 
with more centralized and bureaucratized prosecutorial services, the decision by an individual 
prosecutor to decline charges is reviewable by supervisors. General guidance about the filing 
of charges is also set at the departmental level. See JOHNSON, supra note 21 at 128–32; Moohr, 
supra note 21. 
 44 See Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide Accountability Deficit for 
Criminal Prosecutors, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1587, 1604–09 (2010). 
 45 The National Police Association wrote a letter of complaint about the incoming Suffolk 
County, Massachusetts chief prosecutor’s declination policies. Letter from Nat’l Police Ass’n 
to Constance V. Vecchione, Bar Counsel (Dec. 23, 2018), https://nationalpolice.org/dev/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/DA_Rachael_Rollins_Complaint.pdf [perma.cc/g975-4egk]. 
 46 E.g., Andrea Estes & Shelley Murphy, Stopping Injustice or Putting the Public at Risk? 
Suffolk DA Rachael Rollins’s Tactics Spur Pushback, BOSTON GLOBE (July 6, 2019, 5:57 PM) 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/07/06/stopping-injustice-putting-public-risk-
suffolk-rachael-rollins-tactics-spur-pushback/IFC6Rp4tVHiVhOf2t97bFI/story.html 
[perma.cc/vfc3-mt8g] (“Some fellow prosecutors as well as police officials fear that Rollins 
is compromising public safety by letting criminals off the hook, while some judges have 
scolded her assistants in open court for letting repeat offenders go and sometimes not 
requesting bail in serious cases.”). 
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critiques of their policies, creating a discussion that rarely happens in the 
context of individual case declinations.47 
This Part reviews two leading approaches to defining the limits of the 
prosecutor’s power to decline charges. One approach places stronger limits 
on the power, allowing declinations only in exceptional cases and never in 
categorical form. The second approach endorses virtually all exercises of 
leniency by prosecutors. Despite the different outcomes they produce, 
however, these two approaches share a reliance on separation of powers 
principles and a uniform, traditional account of the prosecutor’s job. For that 
reason, neither approach to prosecutor declinations is sufficient to explain the 
proper limits on this power. The job of the prosecutor differs from place to 
place, making it inappropriate to set uniform limits on declinations in every 
community and for every office. 
A. ADVOCATES FOR EXCEPTIONAL AND CASE-LEVEL DECLINATIONS 
Some critics of declination policies set the theoretical boundaries for 
proper declinations in terms of historical practice or constitutional structure. 
They ask whether declinations of different types fall within the traditional 
duties of prosecutors. 
One prominent school of thought follows this line of reasoning to 
conclude that prosecutors should restrict themselves to declinations for 
individual cases and should avoid general and prospective policies. One 
might call this the individual-only option. For instance, U.S. Attorney 
General William Barr and other officials in the U.S. Department of Justice 
have attacked state court prosecutors who refuse to file minor criminal 
charges.48 Barr criticizes these prosecutors for abdicating the prosecutor’s 
traditional functions in two senses. First, Barr argues that prosecutors provide 
inadequate support for police officers when they decline to pursue too many 
cases.49 Prosecutors work in tandem with the police to maximize the impact 
 
 47 See Fair and Just Prosecution, Statement in Response to Attorney General William Barr, 
(Feb. 13, 2020), https://fairandjustprosecution.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Prosecutor-St
atement-Responding-to-AG-Barr.pdf [perma.cc/p388-z2jj]; Sawyer, supra note 10, at 633–
34. 
 48 Barr, supra note 8; Jeffrey A. Rosen, Deputy Att’y Gen., Remarks at Wake Forest 
University (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-jeffr
ey-rosen-delivers-remarks-wake-forest-school-law [perma.cc/r2ej-rkp9]. 
 49 Barr, supra note 8 (“demoralizing to law enforcement and dangerous to public safety.”); 
Rosen, supra note 48; Jan Ransom, After Rift Over Protests, N.Y.P.D. Pulls Out of 
Prosecutors’ Offices, N.Y. Times (June 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/15/
nyregion/nypd-district-attorneys-protests.html [perma.cc/4rcr-wrb5] (quoting police 
association official criticizing prosecutor decision not to file charges against protesters for 
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of criminal charges, especially those resulting in prison sentences. Thus, he 
says, declinations should be exceptional because each charge that a 
prosecutor turns away damages trust with law enforcement and weakens the 
deterrent power of the criminal law.50 
Second, according to this line of critique, prosecutors invade the 
legislature’s role when they make prospective categorical judgments about 
which crimes are worth prosecuting and which are not. Categorical no-charge 
policies go beyond the prosecutor’s duty to enforce the law that others 
create.51 
There are several problems with this critique.52 For one thing, it ignores 
traditional practices of local chief prosecutors, who commonly formulate 
general guidance for their line prosecutors about when to decline charges.53 
For decades, prosecutor offices have issued policy guidance to line 
prosecutors, including policies that instruct prosecutors to decline charges for 
“joyriding” or to ignore theft or destruction of property cases that fall below 
 
curfew violations, because picking which laws to enforce is “a dereliction of duty to their oath 
of office”). 
 50 Id.; Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of “Public” Prosecutors in 
Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1338 (2002); Mark Berman, These 
Prosecutors Won Office Vowing to Fight the System. Now, the System is Fighting Back, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 9, 2019, 5:52 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/these-prosecutors-
won-office-vowing-to-fight-the-system-now-the-system-is-fighting-back/2019/11/05/20d863
f6-afc1-11e9-a0c9-6d2d7818f3da_story.html [perma.cc/7pme-r8ww] (describing predictions 
that declination policies will create “public safety crisis”). 
 51 See Ayala v. Scott, 224 So. 3d 755, 758–59 (Fla. 2017); Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 
1002, 1006–07 (N.Y. 1997); Jouvenal & Weiner, supra note 35 (describing views of local 
actors who frame categorical declination policies as separation of powers issue); Foster, supra 
note 2, at 2516–25 (describing separation of powers challenges under federal and state law); 
Jessica Pishko, Prosecutors are Banding Together to Prevent Criminal-Justice Reform, THE 
NATION (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/prosecutors-are-banding-together
-to-prevent-criminal-justice-reform [perma.cc/uj4w-ms8q] (discussing separation of powers 
argument that some prosecutor critics employ); Bobby Allyn, U.S. Attorney Slams 
Philadelphia DA Over ‘Culture of Disrespect for Law Enforcement,’ NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(Aug.17, 2019, 4:26 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/17/752051788/u-s-attorney-slams-
philadelphia-da-over-culture-of-disrespect-for-law-enforcemen [perma.cc/edv6-v4uj]. 
 52 For an argument about the stunted vision of crime control that animates Barr’s 
argument, see Ronald Wright, Opinion, Attorney General Barr Wrong About Role of 
Prosecutors. Tough-on-Crime Stance Stunts Progress, USA TODAY (Dec. 27, 2019, 8:35 PM) 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/policing/spotlight/2019/12/27/barr-wrong-role-
prosecutors-tough-crime-stance/2757304001 [https://perma.cc/Q5YR-C2SB]. 
 53 See Donald G. Gifford, Equal Protection and the Prosecutor’s Charging Decision: 
Enforcing an Ideal, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 659, 705–06 (1981); Richard S. Frase, The 
Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 
47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246, 290–95 (1980); Mario Merola, Modern Prosecutorial Techniques, 16 
CRIM. L. BULL. 232, 237–38 (1980). 
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a designated level of property loss.54 The policies are prospective and 
categorical. If categorical declinations are not part of the prosecutor’s job, 
that would be news to the prosecutors themselves. 
Another problem with the critique is that it starts from the false 
assumption that all prosecutors perform the same job. These criticisms from 
federal prosecutors, directed to state and local prosecutors, show no 
awareness that state and local prosecutors operate in a completely different 
legal and institutional universe from them. They have different budgets to 
allocate, unique law enforcement relationships to manage, distinctive judicial 
concerns to address, and higher volumes of cases to manage. There is no 
single prosecutorial tradition that encompasses all of the many ways that 
prosecutors respond to their different institutional environments and 
distinctive threats to local public safety. It is therefore inappropriate to 
construct a single theory of prosecutor declinations on the basis of a single—
and non-existent—tradition of the prosecutor’s work. 
B. ADVOCATES FOR LENIENCY ACROSS ALL SETTINGS  
Another approach to declination approves almost all forms of leniency 
by criminal prosecutors. There are a few outer limits to declinations under 
this leniency option. For instance, the reasons for declination should reflect 
the common good, rather than private advantage,55 and the refusal to charge 
cannot be motivated by invidious discrimination.56 But even with those 
limitations, the claim is broad. A prosecutor’s refusal to charge could be 
based on evidentiary weakness in the case or on proportionality concerns; it 
could also take the form of a silent declination in a single case or an 
announced policy of leniency for entire categories of crimes or suspects.57 
Like the reasonable doubt standard of proof at trial, a broad prosecutorial 
power to decline cases is part of a constitutional order that favors liberty. 
One rationale for this wide-open approach to declinations invokes 
history: single-case declinations were a normal part of the legal landscape 
 
 54 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 24, at 23–24; Lundquist, supra note 24, at 493–94. 
 55 See Green & Roiphe, supra note 7, at 831–33. 
 56 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–65 (1996); Wayte v. United States, 
470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). 
 57 See Jeffrey Bellin, Defending Progressive Prosecution, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 25–26), https://ssrn.com/abstract= 3479165; Fairfax, supra 
note 7, at 1246–58; Zachary S. Price, Reliance on Nonenforcement, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
937, 963–70 (2017); George C. Thomas, III, Discretion and Criminal Law: The Good, The 
Bad, and the Mundane, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1043, 1049–53 (2005). 
838 WRIGHT [Vol. 110 
during early U.S. history.58 Granted, this practice did not mean as much in 
the distant past as it does today, largely because public prosecutor offices in 
that earlier era did not hold a monopoly over the selection of charges. Instead, 
private attorneys represented crime victims—that is, they prosecuted cases—
in state criminal courts, which meant that no policy or practice of the public 
prosecutor could prevent private parties and their attorneys from filing their 
own criminal charges.59 But during the ensuing decades, courts and 
legislatures reduced the role of crime victims in charging decisions and gave 
public prosecutors greater centralized control over filing charges.60 Under 
this new scheme, prosecutors could make their declinations stick. 
Furthermore, as public prosecution became the work of full-time attorneys in 
offices with bureaucratic routines, their declinations moved beyond the 
single-case setting. It became more common to encounter office rules and 
expectations about declinations.61 
Thus, although historical practice does support a leniency-based 
account of declinations to some extent, history falls short of a complete 
explanation. Early declination practice only extended to single cases and 
even the more recent examples of general office guidance about declinations 
were typically framed as presumptive internal guidance for ordinary cases 
rather than clear-cut prospective rules announced to the public.62 
A second rationale for broad declination power comes from the 
separation of powers doctrine. According to this view, judges cannot limit 
 
 58 See JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 28–36 
(1980) (describing discretionary charging power of prosecutors as chief law enforcement 
officer in nineteenth and twentieth centuries). The theory distinguishes criminal prosecutors 
from other executive branch enforcement agents, who arguably have more limited authority 
to decline enforcement actions. There are administrative enforcement contexts, however, 
where a comparison to criminal case declinations is treated as relevant. Cf. Zohra Ahmed, The 
Sanctuary of Prosecutorial Nullification, 83 ALB. L. REV. 239 (2019) (describing role of local 
prosecutors in blocking operation of federal discretion over immigration removals by 
declining charges that would trigger removal process); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 
821 (1985). 
 59 See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private 
Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411 (2009). 
 60 See State ex rel. Wild v. Otis, 257 N.W.2d 361, 365 (Minn. 1977); State v. Harrington, 
534 S.W.2d 44, 49–50 (Mo. 1976); JACOBY, supra note 58, at 16–19. 
 61 See Abrams, supra note 25 at 13–18; Norm Maleng, Charging and Sentencing: Where 
Prosecutors’ Guidelines Help Both Sides, 1 CRIM. JUST. 6, 42–43 (1987); Kim Banks Mayer, 
Applying Open Records Policy to Wisconsin District Attorneys: Can Charging Guidelines 
Promote Public Awareness? 1996 WIS. L. REV. 295, 303–04 (identifying four prosecutorial 
offices that had adopted charge guidelines). 
 62 See Frank J. Remington, The Decision to Charge, the Decision to Convict on a Plea of 
Guilty, and the Impact of Sentence Structure on Prosecution Practices, in DISCRETION IN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 73, 78–79, 86–90, 100 (Lloyd E. Ohlin & Frank J. Remington eds. 1993). 
2020] PROSECUTORS AND THEIR POLITIES 839 
the prosecutor’s decision to refuse charges because the Constitution assigns 
that choice to the prosecutor.63 
Courts have routinely affirmed that prosecutors may decline to file 
charges, even if a grand jury or judge decided that criminal charges were 
appropriate.64 The power to initiate criminal charges (and the concomitant 
power not to begin the case) is often said to be a quintessential executive 
power, sitting right at the heart of the separation of powers doctrine.65 Judicial 
opinions describe the prosecutor’s authority over charge selection in broad 
terms. Those holdings deal with single-case declinations, but their rationales 
and the dicta could easily apply to categorical declinations based on office 
policies. 
Although this argument for a wide-ranging authority to decline cases 
has important virtues, it misses some of the diversity among prosecutors’ 
offices and practices across jurisdictions. Prosecutorial duties are not the 
same everywhere. Some prosecutors have control over the entire criminal 
docket, while others divide responsibilities for misdemeanor and ordinance 
violations with city prosecutors or other specialized offices.66 Some 
prosecutors even represent units of city or county government on civil 
matters.67 Still another jurisdictional variation allows for prosecutors to assert 
a role for their offices in matters both upstream and downstream from the 
criminal courts, on issues such as diversion of potential defendants into 
community treatment and reentry of former defendants into the community 
after serving their criminal sentences.68 These and other differences in 
history, power-sharing arrangements, and non-courtroom duties that apply to 
prosecutors in each state suggest that the nature of the prosecutor’s job takes 
distinctive forms in different places. 
Furthermore, even if we were to give controlling weight to the 
separation of powers doctrine to determine what counts as a prosecutorial 
function, that doctrine also varies by state. The individual-only and leniency 
options for prosecutor declinations both treat federal and state constitutional 
 
 63 See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
989, 1044 (2006). But see Sawyer, supra note 10 (proposing functional separation-of-powers 
framework that recognizes some legislative authority of prosecutors). 
 64 See Brown, supra note 4, at 66–67. 
 65 See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171–72 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. 
Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa. 187, 190 (1845). 
 66 See Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in 3D, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1119, 1142 (2012); Sandra G. Mayson & Megan T. Stevenson, Misdemeanors 
by the Numbers, 61 B.C. L. REV. 971, 989–93 (2020). 
 67 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-532 (2020). 
 68 See Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 321, 363–66 (2002). 
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doctrine on the separation of powers as identical. But judges interpret some 
state constitutions to give the judiciary only limited roles over the initial 
filing and dismissal of criminal charges.69 Judges in other states, however, 
read their constitutions and interconnected statutes to grant themselves a 
persistent power over dismissals.70 Further, in certain types of cases (for 
instance, criminal statutes that trigger mandatory minimum sentences), 
judges treat the power to file or decline the charge as a component of the 
sentencing power the state constitution reserves for judges. As a result, under 
such statutes, judges have some constitutionally mandated input in a charging 
decision.71 
Each of the two leading accounts of prosecutorial declination authority 
reviewed here—the more restrictive version that allows only case-specific 
declinations and the broader endorsement of prosecutorial exercises of 
leniency in any form—proceed from a uniform view of prosecutors. Public 
prosecutors in the United States, they presume, operate within a single 
historical tradition, a single definition of the role of a prosecutor. A uniform 
theory of declinations, however, does not work well for all the varied state 
and local prosecutor offices in the United States.72 The features of the job 
that all prosecutors share across jurisdictions are relevant, but the common 
ground among prosecutors is not sufficient to set uniform limits on their 
declinations. 
III. DUTIES TO THE STATEWIDE POLITY 
A search for the outer boundaries of prosecutorial power—as seen 
through the lens of history and separation of powers doctrine—is not enough 
to evaluate prosecutor declination practices. A more pragmatic approach 
explores the level of government in which prosecutors operate.73 
If separation of powers doctrine divides power into three columns (one 
for each branch of government), a level of government approach divides that 
power into rows (one row each for federal, state, and local governments).74 
 
 69 See Brown, supra note 4, at 67–76. 
 70 Id. at 67–73. 
 71 See State v. Brimage, 706 A.2d 1096, 1106–07 (N.J. 1998). 
 72 See generally David Alan Sklansky, The Problems with Prosecutors, 1 ANN. REV. 
CRIMINOLOGY 451 (2018); Sklansky, supra note 7 (describing prosecutors as actors that 
mediate between conflicting system values). 
 73 For a similar effort to evaluate the impact of many contextual factors on the selection 
of a prosecutorial declination policy, see generally Murray, supra note 14. 
 74 For a discussion of “vertical” and “horizontal” imagery in separation of powers theory, 
see generally Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749 (1999) 
(characterizing government departments with different functions as separated powers along a 
horizontal axis). 
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Some powers are available only to government actors on the federal level, 
but those powers might not be effective to address issues that operate on the 
state or local levels. Similarly, state powers do not reliably extend to 
problems on the federal or the local level. 
Within this framework, state criminal prosecutors occupy a conflicted 
position, reaching across two levels of government. On the one hand, they 
derive some authority from the state government and should use that power 
to benefit the public statewide. On the other hand, local government is the 
source of some prosecutors’ authority and capacity, and they should exercise 
those aspects of their power to represent the best interests of the local public. 
This Section discusses the legal environments that strengthen the 
statewide polity’s claims. I argue that declination policies are easiest to 
square with the claims of a statewide polity when they are framed as 
presumptions linked to the allocation of scarce resources. These declination 
practices are accepted as routine and legitimate, even for prosecutors who 
work in a setting that stresses duty to a statewide polity. 
A. SOURCES OF STATEWIDE LOYALTY  
The starting point for a prosecutor’s loyalty to a statewide electorate is 
the particular criminal law that the prosecutor proposes to enforce. If the 
criminal case is based on a violation of a local ordinance, voters elsewhere 
in the state have little or no stake in the enforcement of that law.75 On the 
other hand, if the prosecutor files criminal charges under a state statute, a 
statewide polity created that legal resource. Voters from all over the state 
elected legislators who passed that bill, along with the governor who signed 
it. Those voters may have an interest in seeing that law enforced throughout 
the state, not just in their own neighborhoods. 
As a conceptual starting point, the statewide polity should control 
whether a duly passed statute will be enforced throughout the state. Majority 
rule is a central concept in criminal law, as in other fields. It is difficult to see 
how a minority concentrated in one part of a state should be able to declare a 
state criminal law inapplicable, even within its own local boundaries. The 
minority might disapprove of the statute, the policy, and the moral judgment 
it embodies. Yet, as an initial matter, a majority of voters in the state should 
 
 75 See Brenner Fissell, Local Offenses, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) 
(manuscript at 21–22), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3552179; see generally Wayne A. Logan, 
The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409, 1421–38 (2001) 
(describing origins and extent of power of local governments to create criminal law). 
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expect the law to remain in force throughout the state, even in places where 
a statewide minority makes up a local majority.76 
Although statewide applicability is the starting point for any analysis, it 
is not the endpoint for every statute. Statutes that represent a fundamental 
statement of values constrain prosecutors the most. These provisions form 
the traditional core of any state criminal code, revealing a considered and 
sustained judgment by the statewide polity that prosecutors should enforce a 
particular social norm.77 On the other hand, criminal statutes that merely 
provide “tools” to achieve a larger end, such as public safety, demand less 
loyalty and allow a prosecutor more room to consider competing objectives. 
What marks the difference, then, between the core and the periphery? 
Which statutes require prosecutors to recognize their uniform and statewide 
applicability, and which are merely tools that a local prosecutor might declare 
to be poorly suited for the needs of the local district? 
One indicator is typical levels of usage. Long-term charging practices 
show us that some statutes, though still on the books, go largely unenforced.78 
The Administrative Office of the Courts for any given state can generate a 
frequency table of criminal statutes that have formed the basis for all 
prosecutions in the state during the past year. Some statutes (such as simple 
assault) are used often. Other statutes (such as bans on adultery and other 
forms of consensual sexual activity), though they still appear in the criminal 
code, are not used at all. Similarly, some statutes are used in only a handful 
of cases, limited to just a few districts in the state.79 The same remains true, 
 
 76 Cf. Kamin, supra note 34, at 203–05 (arguing that deferral of federal prosecution under 
immigration laws, unlike declination of federal prosecution under marijuana laws, “creates 
new rights” for potential targets of prosecution by declaring limited reach of laws in 
categorical terms). 
 77 This account stresses the expressive purposes of the criminal law. See generally Joel 
Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397 (1965) (distinguishing 
expressive purposes of criminal law from traditional accounts of criminal law purposes). 
 78 See Kay L. Levine, The External Evolution of Criminal Law, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1039, 1057–87 (2008) (tracking cycles of enforcement for statutory rape laws). 
 79 See Jessica Smith, Detailed North Carolina Statewide & County-Level Criminal 
Charging Data, N.C. CRIM. L.: UNC SCH. OF GOV’T BLOG (June 8, 2020, 10:00 AM), 
https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/detailed-north-carolina-statewide-county-level-criminal-
charging-data/ [perma.cc/9667-xhja] (listing North Carolina statutes that formed the basis for 
fewer than 100 cases in a year, in a state with 100 counties and 43 prosecutorial districts); cf. 
Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV. 69, 115–17 (2011) 
(describing examples of prosecutors cutting costs by reducing prosecutions under criminal 
statutes that prosecutor treats as lower priorities). 
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year after year, with the same statutes routinely appearing at the top and the 
bottom of the frequency table.80 
Sometimes a criminal statute falls into disuse over time. Perhaps the 
social problem seems less pressing or different legal tools come along to 
address it more effectively. Legislatures in the United States, when compared 
to legislatures elsewhere in the world, place little stock in the coherence of 
the criminal code.81 They are willing to add new provisions without much 
thought about whether they eclipse existing sections of the code, and they are 
happy to leave the relative importance of related statutes to the choices of 
future prosecutors.82 
Further, it is not only older statutes that settle into a lower priority 
category over time. In some cases, legislators understand from the start that 
their new criminal statute will generate only a few cases, either because the 
conduct occurs rarely or because existing statutes already address the 
problem.83 They nevertheless vote for a statute to give the prosecutor an 
additional tool for plea bargaining or to signal an awareness that some new 
social harm has arrived. Even if an existing statute could have covered the 
new harm, legislatures figure it never hurts to express newfound concern.84 
In sum, little-used and duplicative statutes exist in every state’s criminal 
code. The consistent failure of prosecutors to charge under these laws 
amounts to a mute categorical judgment. These are not just examples of 
prosecutors making a few declinations in exceptional cases. Rather, they 
represent an unspoken, consensus-based judgment among prosecutors that 
some statutes no longer serve the needs of the state, or at least most parts of 
the state.85 
The statutes with the longest history of low frequency filings deserve 
the least consideration from prosecutors. That is especially true if the rare 
filings are limited to particular areas in the state. Conversely, criminal 
 
 80 Michael Edmund O’Neill, When Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial 
Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 267–71 (2004). 
 81 William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The 
Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 
1339 (1993). 
 82 See Richard E. Myers II, Responding to the Time-Based Failures of the Criminal Law 
Through a Criminal Sunset Amendment, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1327, 1332–39 (2008). 
 83 See Robert G. Morvillo & Barry A. Bohrer, Checking the Balance: Prosecutorial Power 
in an Age of Expansive Legislation, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 137, 142–43 (1995); William J. 
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 529–33 (2001). 
 84 See Stuntz, supra note 83, at 529–33. 
 85 See Price, supra note 57. In extreme cases, non-enforcement of a criminal law might 
amount to a legal defense—known as “desuetude”—against current prosecution. Linda 
Rodgers & William Rodgers, Desuetude as a Defense, 52 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1966). 
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statutes that are frequently enforced across different areas of the state and are 
enforced consistently over the years make the strongest claims for continued 
enforcement on behalf of the statewide electorate. 
Another indicator of a strong claim for the prosecutor to obey the 
statewide polity appears in criminal statutes that have strong spillover effects 
from district to district.86 Some crimes address social harms that are primarily 
local, while others speak to harmful acts that affect places far from the scene 
of the crime. For instance, criminal prosecutions under environmental 
statutes that punish discharges into rivers and streams are designed to protect 
all downstream parties, not just those in the district where the water pollution 
began. Similarly, a refusal to enforce gun control laws against noncompliant 
sellers of firearms in one county could result in deaths and injuries in some 
other county. 
If it is true that each criminal law creates a stronger or weaker claim of 
loyalty to a statewide polity, what response from a prosecutor is appropriate 
when a law makes such a claim? We turn now to that question. 
B. PRESUMPTIONS LINKED TO RESOURCE PRIORITIES 
Just as state legislatures create the criminal statutes that form the basis 
for most prosecutions, they also build state court systems and fund the 
personnel to operate them. In performing those latter functions, state 
legislatures fund the courts and prosecutors at modest levels that make it 
impossible to enforce the criminal law to its fullest extent. In so doing, state 
legislatures build a need for declinations into the prosecutorial system with 
the budgets they allot. 
The level of court funding today says more about state priorities than it 
once did. Throughout the twentieth century, states tended to centralize their 
court systems. They eliminated many municipal courts and consolidated 
court funding and governance at the state level.87 There were and still are 
holdouts: municipal courts still exist, funded at the local level.88 In those 
exceptional settings, when prosecutors decline charges in the municipal 
courts, they respond mostly to a local polity. In the more typical state-funded 
and state-governed courts, however, the choices of state actors have an 
important effect on prosecutor declinations. If state legislatures only fund a 
limited number of judges and courtrooms, their budget decisions necessarily 
 
 86 See Murray, supra note 14 (manuscript at 51). 
 87 Ronald F. Wright, The Wickersham Commission and Local Control of Criminal 
Prosecution, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1199, 1211–12 (2013). 
 88 See RON MALEGA & THOMAS H. COHEN, DEP’T. OF JUST. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., STATE 
COURT ORGANIZATION, 2011 at 15–19, (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sco11.
pdf [perma.cc/lby4-eh5a]. 
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envision—and tacitly endorse—declination power for the prosecutor. 
Funding levels confirm that statewide representatives, speaking for a 
statewide polity, expect prosecutors to prioritize some crimes above others.89 
Inevitably, the competing uses of limited state funds for criminal prosecution 
play out differently in various districts. Local variety is baked in. 
For that reason, a policy can, without controversy, connect declinations 
of one crime to the budget for prosecution of other crimes.90 The office policy 
might, for example, declare that local prosecutors will redirect resources 
from drug possession or larceny of small dollar amounts to firearms 
offenses.91 These are the easy cases. The relative importance of various 
crimes will differ from place to place, and state legislatures naturally expect 
local officials to make these tradeoffs.92 Such resource-based declination 
policies acknowledge that all of the state criminal statutes remain in force in 
the local district, but that office policy places some statutes at the back of the 
line. 
It is more challenging, but still possible, to justify prosecutor policies 
that announce presumptions against filing charges under a statute without 
explicitly linking that presumption to resource allocation. For instance, a 
policy might declare that the office will only file charges in marijuana 
possession charges in cases involving threats to juveniles or other 
pronounced threats to public safety.93 For these crimes, the prosecutor 
chooses and announces priorities among the various actions the state 
legislature has declared blameworthy. Without declaring that a particular 
crime is not actually blameworthy within the district, prosecutors can use the 
presumption built into the office policy to appropriately declare that some 
 
 89 See H. Richard Uviller, Poorer But Wiser: The Bar Looks Back at Its Contribution to 
the Impeachment Spectacle, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 897, 899–901 (1999). 
 90 See Kamin, supra note 34, at 185; Joshua Luke Sandoval, Ethical Considerations for 
Prosecutors: How Recent Advancements Have Changed the Face of Prosecution, 10 ST. 
MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 60, 71, 98–100 (2019) (prosecutor reflecting on 
role of budgetary limits in declination policy choices). 
 91 See ROLLINS, supra note 2 (describing policy of presumed refusal to charge for fifteen 
offenses, including marijuana, shoplifting, and trespass); Schmadeke, supra note 31 (naming 
a motivation in raising bar for felony retail theft as “prioritizing limited resources”). 
 92 See Joan E. Jacoby, The Charging Policies of Prosecutors, in THE PROSECUTOR 75, 78–
79 (William F. McDonald, ed., 1979); Thomas, supra note 57, at 1046–53 (arguing that 
charging discretion is beneficial when it makes the criminal code more closely aligned with 
public priorities); Ronald F. Wright, Persistent Localism in the Prosecutorial Services of 
North Carolina, 41 CRIME & JUST. 211, 216–19 (2012). 
 93 See Clifford & Goldstein, supra note 28. 
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wrongs are more important than others.94 This does not amount to a judgment 
that the state law no longer applies within the district.95 It still leaves open 
the possibility that even a low-priority state law could outrank other potential 
crimes in particular circumstances. 
Federal enforcement of marijuana possession and distribution crimes 
offers another example of the use of presumptions in declination policy. 
Federal law makes it a crime to possess marijuana.96 Some states, however, 
have decriminalized marijuana possession.97 Under a Department of Justice 
policy adopted in 2010, prosecutors do not declare categorically that 
marijuana possession in those states no longer violates federal law, and they 
make no commitment to stop filing such charges altogether. Instead, federal 
policy creates a presumption against prosecution in marijuana possession 
cases, instructing federal prosecutors to file charges in such cases only if they 
present particular risks of violence.98 That policy is justified both in terms of 
limited resources and on the basis of public safety priorities. 
The easiest way to justify a categorical declination policy is to 
implement the policy as a presumption and to explain the policy as a better 
use of limited resources that can deliver the best results for the local district. 
The greatest objection to a presumptive policy is possible dishonesty.99 There 
may be times when the chief prosecutor, in truth, has decided not to bring 
any charges under a statute under any circumstances. In those cases, 
however, it would not mislead the public to explain the policy as a 
presumption even though there is no serious prospect that a case would ever 
arrive to rebut the presumption. A prosecutor who adopts a categorical 
declination policy normally has several reasons for doing so, including some 
 
 94 Sklansky, supra note 72, at 463–64 (describing the role of voters in holding prosecutors 
accountable for their office priorities); see Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus 
Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 990–91 (2009). This power to prioritize 
crimes holds true across various conceptions of democracy, whether it be participatory, 
representative, or otherwise. See David Alan Sklansky, Unpacking the Relationship between 
Prosecutors and Democracy in the United States, in PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY 276, 
283–86 (Máximo Langer and David Alan Sklansky, eds., 2017). 
 95 Cf. Kamin, supra note 34, at 200–03 (arguing that federal policy disfavoring marijuana 
charges in some jurisdictions is legitimate because it does not purport to invalidate the federal 
law within those boundaries). 
 96 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 844 (2018). 
 97 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(3). 
 98 Justice Department Issues Memo on Marijuana Enforcement, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 4, 
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-issues-memo-marijuana-enforcem
ent [perma.cc/3j6t-8c37]; Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions for All United 
States Att’ys on Marijuana Enforcement (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/1022196/download [perma.cc/sgu3-f9xy]. 
 99 See Sawyer, supra note 10. 
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reasons that depend on current circumstances. The public would benefit from 
hearing the entire range of reasons. Describing a policy as a strong 
presumption still gives the public adequate notice and can prompt public 
debate and accountability.100 Announcing a presumption also shows an 
attractive modesty on the part of the prosecutor, leaving open the possibility 
that new evidence or new arguments might change the ordinary outcome and 
lead to charges in exceptional cases. Even if the presumption of declination 
is strong, it accurately informs the public that unforeseen circumstances in 
the future might change the outcome. 
Finally, the variety that is possible for declinations does not operate in 
the same way for procedural rules. For instance, state statutes related to the 
prosecutor’s duty to disclose evidence to the defense are binding on locally-
elected prosecutors, even if local voters would not approve of those particular 
disclosure rules.101 Statewide procedural controls, however, set only a 
minimum level of procedural fairness. They leave room for local prosecutors 
to declare local policies, such as open file discovery, that place higher 
standards on local prosecutors than state statutes require. 
IV. DUTIES TO THE LOCAL POLITY 
The enforcement resources created at the state level—criminal statutes 
combined with limited budgets that force prosecutors to pick their 
priorities—support the use of case-specific declinations by prosecutors.102 
Those legal resources at the state level also justify prospective declination 
policies in a prosecutor’s office when those policies are framed in terms of a 
presumption against charging linked to the limited resources of the office. 
Such a presumption acknowledges the mixed signals that prosecutors receive 
from the state polity:  the existence of a criminal statute on the one hand and 
budgetary constraints on the other. A presumption respects the judgment of 
the voters whose legislators declared certain conduct to be criminal, while 
choosing the local priorities that limited state budgets make necessary. 
But the mixed message that prosecutors receive from state government 
does not tell the whole story. Interactions between state and local levels of 
accountability for the prosecutor make the story even more complicated. 
The local polity sometimes prefers that a prosecutor decline more cases 
than the state polity would tolerate. Under some circumstances, such views 
 
 100 See Murray, supra note 14 (manuscript at 40–41). 
 101 See generally Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery 
in Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285 (2016) 
(describing implementation of discovery laws in two states). 
 102 See Kamin, supra note 34; Murray, supra note 14 (manuscript at 2–3). 
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held by the local polity make a difference for prosecutor declination 
policies,103 adding further support to declination policies framed as 
presumptions.104 Furthermore, local input can sometimes justify a categorical 
policy to decline charges and not just a presumption against certain 
charges.105 This Section examines the sources of a prosecutor’s duties of 
loyalty to a local polity. 
To see the difference level of government makes, recall the handful of 
states that do not elect their chief prosecutors on the local level. In 
Connecticut, the local prosecutors’ offices in major population centers follow 
the lead of a statewide Chief State Attorney, who is appointed by a 
commission of court officials.106 Across the border in Massachusetts, 
however, each chief local prosecutor is elected.107 Imagine, then, that the 
State’s Attorney in New Haven, Connecticut (a local prosecutor) and the 
District Attorney in Berkshire County, Massachusetts (another local 
prosecutor) each announce a declination policy related to drug possession 
 
 103 See Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, Citizen Oversight and the Electoral 
Incentives of Criminal Prosecutors, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 334, 338–39 (2002). For a discussion 
of the interaction between professional expertise and public preferences for prosecutor office 
practices, see William H. Simon, The Organization of Prosecutorial Discretion, in 
PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY 175, 191–94 (Máximo Langer and David Alan Sklansky eds., 
2017). For more skeptical views about democratic input into declination priorities for a 
prosecutor’s office, see generally Charles E. MacLean & Stephen Wilks, Keeping Arrows in 
the Quiver: Mapping the Contours of Prosecutorial Discretion, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 59, 72 
(2012); John Rappaport, Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 711 (2020); Michael Tonry, Prosecutors and Politics in Comparative Perspective, 41 
CRIME AND JUST. 1 (2012). 
 104 While public input may properly influence the prosecutor’s choice of priorities and 
setting general policies, it cannot have any role in the decisions of an individual prosecutor 
about whether to file charges in an individual case. The distinction between policy choices 
and case-level decisions marks the line where prosecutorial independence becomes a critical 
value. See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, When Prosecutors Politick: Progressive Law 
Enforcers Then and Now, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 719, 732–33 (2020); David Alan 
Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape for Elected Prosecutors, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 647, 673–74 (2017). 
 105 See Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 785, 
801-06 (2012) (declination practices declared overtly can result in differential application of 
criminal law that “can be seen as beneficial under theories of federalism and localism”); Leigh 
Osofsky, The Case for Categorical Nonenforcement, 69 TAX. L. REV. 73, 131–32 (2015) 
(arguing for categorical nonenforcement under some circumstances). 
 106 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-278(a) (2019). 
 107 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 12 (2019). 
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cases.108 Is there any doubt that we should evaluate these decisions according 
to different criteria? 
For the State’s Attorney in Connecticut, the declination policy must 
further any policies and priorities of the Chief State Attorney. If the statewide 
policy itself prohibits local variation, the State’s Attorney in New Haven 
cannot properly consider the views of New Haven residents in deciding 
whether to file charges in drug possession cases.109 For the District Attorney 
in Berkshire County, on the other hand, there is no statewide policy to 
implement. She is free to consider the views of local voters in deciding 
whether to charge drug possession crimes or to direct those limited office 
resources to some other priority. Indeed, we might criticize an elected local 
prosecutor for ignoring the wishes of her voters when setting local policy 
about declinations.110 This Section explores the basis for that intuition. 
A. LOCAL FUNDING AND EFFECTS AS SOURCES OF LOCAL POWER 
One reason that local views about declinations should carry weight is 
that local governments fund important parts of criminal law enforcement. In 
some jurisdictions, the city or county government operates its own court 
system that specializes in adjudicating misdemeanors and lesser 
infractions.111 Even in states with unified court systems, local taxpayers 
might fund the courthouse building or the prosecutor’s office facilities.112 
Local taxes also sometimes pay for court administrators.113 Local 
governments in some states fund the salaries of a number of attorneys and 
other staff in the prosecutor’s office.114 
Local actors, paid with local funds, also play a central role in some 
diversion programs. Prosecutors’ offices often work with local pretrial 
 
 108 See Josh Landes, After Campaigning on Reform, Berkshire County DA Gets to Work, 
WAMC (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.wamc.org/post/after-campaigning-reform-berkshire-
county-da-gets-work [perma.cc/3b4l-d96k] (describing office initiatives involving juveniles 
and marijuana prosecutions). 
 109 See generally Kay Levine, Should Consistency Be Part of the Reform Prosecutor’s 
Playbook?, 1 HASTINGS J. CRIME & PUNISHMENT 169 (2020) (arguing that procedural 
consistency in consideration of declination factors is more appropriate as an office policy than 
consistency in outcomes of declination decision). 
 110 Cf. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 
837, 840 (2004) (arguing that prosecutors should make discretionary decisions based on 
articulable principles that command broad societal acceptance). 
 111 See Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 66, at 989–93; Henry Ordower, J. S. Onésimo 
Sandoval & Kenneth Warren, Out of Ferguson: Misdemeanors, Municipal Courts, Tax 
Distribution, and Constitutional Limitations, 61 HOWARD L.J. 113, 120–21 (2017). 
 112 See MALEGA & COHEN, supra note 88, at 8 (2013). 
 113 See MALEGA & COHEN, supra note 88, at 8 (2013). 
 114 See IND. CODE § 33-39-6-2 (2020). 
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service agencies or with non-profit community groups to help people accused 
of crimes with the objective of keeping them out of the criminal courts as 
they receive treatment and holding them accountable for their actions.115 
Local governments also pay for many of the community organizations that 
design and operate non-prison punishments that judges may impose after 
convictions for some crimes.116 
Local governments also fund most of the police organizations in the 
United States, and, with that money, the local polity claims the legitimate 
power to control the style and pervasiveness of policing they prefer.117 Local 
contributions to criminal courts, prosecutor personnel and operations, and 
programming for those accused and convicted of crimes all support a similar 
allocation of power: those who pay the piper can call the tune.118 
A second reason that local views about declinations should matter is that 
most crime—and most criminal law enforcement—has concentrated local 
effects. City and county governments pass ordinances to address some of 
these localized social harms. As for crimes that appear in the state criminal 
code, different localities suffer from different levels of crime. Specific types 
of crimes can create stronger or milder reactions in different communities: 
illegal weapon possession, for instance, could create more public anxiety in 
some places than in others. 
A large amount of crime happens within a local social network. A 
disproportionate number of people who are punished for criminal acts come 
from a small set of neighborhoods and commit most of their crimes close to 
 
 115 See Kalani C. Johnson, Robert C. Davis, Melissa Labriola, Michael Rempel & 
Warren A. Reich, An Overview of Prosecutor-Led Diversion Programs: A New Incarnation 
of an Old Idea, 41 JUST. SYS. J. 63, 63 (2019). 
 116 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-301(4) (2020) (providing for local funding of 
community corrections programs). 
 117 See generally David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699 
(2005) (analyzing different frameworks for understanding popular control of policing in 
democratic societies); BRIAN A. REAVES, DEP’T OF JUST. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., LOCAL 
POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2013: PERSONNEL, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES (2015) (describing variety 
in local practices adopted by police departments serving different local constituencies), 
https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/bwc/pdfs/BJS_2013LocalPoliceDeptReport.
pdf [perma.cc/r4us-gy2b]. 
 118 The aphorism, however, doesn’t hold true for some areas of legal practice. See MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.8(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (allowing third parties to pay client’s 
fees only under circumstances that ensure client control of objectives and attorney 
independence). Drawing an analogy to the state and local contributions to prosecutors and 
criminal proceedings, one might treat the state as a third-party payer, helping to obtain legal 
representation for local interests for purposes of public safety. 
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home.119 More generally, criminologists have documented the powerful 
interactions between crime and place.120 The toxic side effects of improper 
law enforcement also matter most at the local level.121 The residents of a local 
community, with their greater awareness of and responsibility for threats to 
public safety, should have the most to tell prosecutors about how to spend 
limited resources to achieve public safety. 
Because of local funding and concentrated local effects, when local 
voters favor declinations under a particular statute, those views strengthen 
the justification for such an office policy. The more difficult question, which 
we explore in the next Section, is whether a local preference for declinations 
adds something that state voter preferences, standing alone, cannot. 
B. STATE GRANTS OF LOCAL AUTONOMY  
Local governments are creatures of state government. They only 
exercise the amount and type of authority that state governments grant them, 
and those grants of legal power take different forms.122 In the declination 
context, many sources of law combine to tell us how much authority state 
government actors grant prosecutors to follow guidance from local voters and 
institutions. 
Home rule provisions in state statutes and constitutions set the scene.123 
Some states grant broad powers to local governments to determine their own 
policies across a wide range of topics, while others grant more limited local 
 
 119 See Sara Wakefield, Invisible Inequality, Million Dollar Blocks, and Extra-Legal 
Punishment: A Review of Recent Contributions to Mass Incarceration Scholarship, 12 
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 209, 212–13 (2010). 
 120 See generally Sangmoon Kim, Randy L. LaGrange & Cecil L. Willis, Place and Crime: 
Integrating Sociology of Place and Environmental Criminology, 49 URB. AFF. REV. 141 
(2013) (analyzing impact of neighborhood characteristics on frequency and types of crimes 
committed in that location); Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669 
(1998) (same); David Weisburd, The Law of Crime Concentration and the Criminology of 
Place, 53 CRIMINOLOGY 133 (2015) (same). 
 121 See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 158–195 
(2011) (arguing that local control of criminal law enforcement would produce more 
appropriate balances between enforcement costs and benefits). 
 122 See generally OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
LAW (3d ed. 2009) (surveying variations in the types of control that state legal institutions 
exercise over local governments); William R. Andersen, Resolving State/Local Governmental 
Conflict—A Tale of Three Cities, 18 URB. L. ANN. 129 (1980) (same). 
 123 Home rule provisions in state law grant various degrees of autonomy to local 
governments to pass their own laws, so long as they do not conflict with state or federal law. 
See generally Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL. 1 
(2006) (describing examples of home rule provisions in state constitutions and statutes); 
Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-first Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253 (2004) 
(proposing changes to home rule doctrine). 
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autonomy.124 This legal framework may not specifically address the work of 
the criminal prosecutor, but it does establish an environment of greater or 
lesser autonomy for local officials to create policies based on local 
conditions.125 
State laws establishing the duties of the local chief prosecutors present 
more direct evidence of the power delegated to the local level to control 
declinations. Typically, statutes place the charging authority in one and only 
one figure for each judicial or prosecutorial district in the state.126 North 
Carolina statutes, for example, place upon each of the forty-three District 
Attorneys throughout the state the duty to “prosecute . . . in the name of the 
State all criminal actions and infractions requiring prosecution” in the state 
courts in the relevant district.127 The same provision also creates a duty to 
“advise the officers of justice in the district attorney’s district,” suggesting a 
coordinating role for public safety in the local community.128 
The statutory grant of authority over charging is directed to local 
prosecutors in particular and not to local actors more generally. These 
statutes do not give local judges a role in the initial selection of charges. Most 
states give trial judges a role in testing the quality of dismissals after the 
prosecutor files,129 but, even then, the judge typically takes a secondary role, 
reacting to the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss charges.130 
Statewide prosecutorial officials, such as the state attorney general, also 
remain on the sideline in the declination decision under the typical statutory 
code. The state Attorneys General have no authority to hire or fire 
prosecutors in the local office.131 In ordinary criminal matters, the Attorneys 
General have limited supervisory authority as well because statutes in most 
states restrict their power to override the local District Attorney’s choices 
 
 124 See generally DALE KRANE, PLATON N. RIGOS & MELVIN B. HILL, JR., HOME RULE IN 
AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK (2001) (surveying variations in home rule provisions in 
state law). 
 125 See Murray, supra note 14 (manuscript at 52–53). 
 126 A few states still allow private citizens to initiate criminal charges, which are subject 
to dismissal by the trial judge or the prosecutor. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-303, 15A-304 
(2019); Brown, supra note 4, at 73–74. 
 127 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-61 (2019). 
 128 Id. 
 129 See Brown, supra note 4, at 70–73. 
 130 See Brown, supra note 4, at 70–73; State v. Winne, 91 A.2d 65, 77–78 (N.J. Super. 
1952), rev’d on other grounds, 96 A.2d 63 (N.J. 1953). 
 131 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-60 (2019) (specifying number of Assistant District Attorneys to 
be hired in each office); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-63 (2019) (empowering District Attorney to 
appoint Assistant District Attorneys, who serve “at the pleasure” of the District Attorney). 
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about declinations.132 Some state statutes grant authority to the attorney 
general for charging decisions in matters that create a conflict of interest for 
the local district attorney’s office.133 A few other statutes affirmatively grant 
the state attorney general the power to file charges in specialized cases, such 
as environmental crimes or financial fraud.134 These exceptional areas are 
treated differently largely because they involve special expertise that might 
not be available to most local prosecutors’ offices and crimes that may 
involve spillover effects that extend beyond the boundaries of a single 
prosecutorial district.135 
It is revealing to compare how state law treats the declination decision 
and the local prosecutor’s role in criminal appeals, whether initiated by the 
defendant or the state. Some states designate the local prosecutor to represent 
the interests of the state,136 while other statutes centralize control of the 
 
 132 The level of restriction on this power of statewide officials to supersede the original 
declination by the local prosecutor varies from state to state. See FLA. STAT. § 27.14(1) (2019); 
Tyler Q. Yeargain, Discretion Versus Supersession: Calibrating the Power Balance Between 
Local Prosecutors and State Officials, 68 EMORY L.J. 95, 110–26 (2018) (reviewing different 
levels of restrictions, including power to supersede if court or commission authorizes it, if 
prosecutor refuses to enforce a law, upon request from another state official, when “public 
interest” requires, or when “necessary”). Rachel Barkow notes that state attorneys general 
rarely invoke the power that statutes grant them to override the charging decisions of local 
prosecutors. Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn 
from the States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 550–56 (2011). For a recent and overtly political 
example of a supersession law drafted to apply to only one local prosecutor, see Akela Lacy 
& Ryan Grim, Pennsylvania Lawmakers Move to Strip Reformist Prosecutor Larry Kramer 
of Authority, THE INTERCEPT (July 8, 2019, 5:55 PM), https://theintercept.com/2019/07/08/da-
larry-krasner-pennsylvania-attorney-general [perma.cc/skn2-yba3] (describing legislation 
that authorizes state attorney general to file charges for one class of cases from a single 
prosecutorial district after the District Attorney announced a declination policy). 
 133 See Barkow, supra note 128, at 549–50. 
 134 See Barkow, supra note 128, at 545–49. 
 135 See infra Part III. 
 136 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.01 (West 2019) (“[D]istrict attorney shall represent 
the State in all criminal cases in the district courts of his district and in appeals therefrom.”). 
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appeals process in the attorney general.137 Still others create joint 
responsibility for appeals between the state and local levels.138 
The government’s use of criminal appeals and its responses to defense 
appeals affect the scope of the substantive criminal law and the investigative 
techniques that the police can pursue. Jurisdictions that allow local 
prosecutors to control or influence criminal appellate practice give those 
prosecutors an important voice in setting the boundaries for criminal 
enforcement. The applications of criminal law that matter the most to local 
prosecutors will be the ones they assert or defend in the appellate courts. 
Those appellate priorities of local prosecutors will play out differently in 
various local districts. 
Taking all of these sources of law together, it is clear that each state 
grants different degrees of independence to its local prosecutors. Some allow 
prosecutors enormous control over the practical meaning of the criminal law 
within their own districts, while others limit the prosecutor to choices about 
the best use of limited resources at the local level. The amount of influence 
state law gives to local prosecutors over criminal law enforcement priorities 
tells us this: greater grants of autonomy to local prosecutors strengthen the 
prosecutor’s duty to local voters. 
The three factors discussed in this part—large payments for criminal 
justice from local governments, concentrated local effects of crime, and 
broad grants of authority under state law to local prosecutors—make the 
voices of local voters more important. When these factors align, they expand 
 
 137 MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-31-11(6) (2019) (local prosecutor “shall assist the Attorney 
General in appeals” from the district to the Mississippi Supreme Court); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 114-2(1) (2019); 74 OKLA. STAT. tit. 74 § 18b (2019) (state attorney general represents state 
in all criminal cases on appeal); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.10.030 (2020) (“Attorney General 
shall appear for and represent the state before the supreme court or the court of appeals in all 
cases in which the state is interested.”). In some states, the Attorney General recovers from 
the county government the costs of pursuing the appeal. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3612(a) 
(2019). 
 138 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17B-107 (2020) (Attorney General “may in his discretion act for 
any county prosecutor in representing the interests of the State in any and all appeals”); 71 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 732-205(c) (2020) (Attorney General “may in his discretion, upon the request 
of the district attorney, prosecute the appeal”). Interestingly, some state codes grant local 
prosecutors authority to control appeals in lower-level crimes or in lower-level appellate 
courts. FLA. R. APP. PROC. 9.140(d)(1)(E) (state attorney for the district represents government 
in criminal appeals to circuit court); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-18a-403 (West 2020) (local 
prosecutor assists Attorney General in appeals to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court, 
prosecutes appeals alone for crimes charged as misdemeanor or ordinance violation); WIS. 
STAT. § 978.05(5) (2020) (district attorney “shall represent the state in any appeal or other 
proceeding if the case is decided by a single court of appeals judge”). 
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the declination policies that prosecutors can adopt, consistent with their 
duties to statewide voters. 
C. APPLICATIONS 
Two applications of this legal framework will reveal more about its 
contours. The first example looks to a policy that sits near the outer bounds: 
a declination policy that is legitimate because all the legal characteristics 
align to strengthen the local prosecutor’s hand. The second example involves 
a declination policy that, in my view, overreaches the local prosecutor’s 
proper authority. 
Local prosecutors have adopted all sorts of policies in connection with 
declination of charges for marijuana possession. Any of them could be 
justified under the right conditions. Starting at the end of the spectrum that is 
easiest to support, an office could reaffirm the traditional authority of line 
prosecutors to decline charges in individual cases, whether based on weak 
evidence or on the disproportionate effects of a criminal prosecution for the 
arrestee. A presumption against filing marijuana possession charges, which 
recognizes the option of filing charges if exceptional circumstances are 
present, would also be consistent with the prosecutor’s duty to state and local 
polities as long as the prosecutor explains this policy as an effort to redirect 
resources to activities that could make a bigger impact on local public safety. 
A policy one step further along the spectrum would involve a 
presumption against charges without any linkage to resource questions. Such 
a policy could be justified in a jurisdiction where the local voters clearly 
indicate their preference to deemphasize marijuana cases in the criminal 
courts and where state law leaves great latitude to local prosecutors about 
charging decisions. Finally, a prosecutor’s office might take the final step 
and enact a mandatory policy against charging for small amounts of 
marijuana—a step beyond creating a presumption. Such a policy would be 
legitimate if several conditions were present. First, the local polity should 
express its desire clearly. Second, state law should treat the possession statute 
as a peripheral crime designed to strengthen the prosecutor’s hand during 
plea negotiations, a status that can be determined from legislative history and 
from charging patterns over time. Third, local funding for community safety 
and security should be robust. Fourth, the crime’s impact and the 
enforcement costs should be concentrated at the local level. Finally, state 
grants of power to local prosecutors to set local enforcement priorities should 
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be broad. When these conditions come together, a categorical policy against 
filing charges under the statute is justifiable.139 
Enforcement of the death penalty within a district presents local 
prosecutors with greater limits on their legitimate declination authority. 
Case-by-case declinations, of course, happen routinely in the death penalty 
context. Prosecutors decide not to file charges under the capital murder 
statute and instead prosecute the case under a different homicide provision.140 
Prosecutors also might declare that their office will only pursue capital 
punishment in the most extreme circumstances, not in every circumstance 
they believe to be legally justified. This policy amounts to a presumption 
against filing the charge. A chief prosecutor could properly base this policy 
on the high cost of death penalty cases, which diverts resources from other 
cases.141 
Local opinion can strengthen the case for a resource-based presumption. 
If prosecutors raise the question of death penalty charges during the election 
campaign and raise their concerns about its expense and ineffectiveness as a 
crime control device in the local district, voters can respond on election day. 
Similarly, if a prosecutor holds real doubts about the constitutionality of the 
death penalty as applied, and those doubts have a colorable basis in current 
law, then refusing to seek the death penalty in cases that would run afoul of 
the prosecutor’s reading of the Constitution would be legitimate. 
More problematic, however, are prosecutor policies that declare a 
categorical refusal to file death penalty cases in the district based on moral 
objections to capital punishment.142 It may be true that the local polity 
 
 139 The same analysis could support declination policies related to other crimes, such as 
prostitution, statutory rape, and destruction of property. See Levine, supra note 79, at 1057–
87 (documenting changes in enforcement patterns for statutory rape laws). 
 140 See MARC L. MILLER, RONALD F. WRIGHT, JENIA I. TURNER, KAY L. LEVINE, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURES: PROSECUTION AND ADJUDICATION: CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE 
MATERIALS 132–35 (6th ed. 2019) (reprinting office policy for Florida prosecutor’s office 
relating to selection of charges in homicide cases). 
 141 See Brandon L. Garrett, Alexander Jakubow & Ankur Desai, The American Death 
Penalty Decline, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 561, 594, 614 (2017); Maurice Chammah, 
The Price of Death: Why Capital Punishment Cases Are in Steep Decline, Even in Texas, 
SLATE (Dec. 17, 2014, 8:00 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/12/death-penalty-
cost-prosecutors-in-rural-counties-cant-afford-to-bring-capital-cases.html [perma.cc/ns4h-
e7kp]. 
 142 Katie Mettler, Florida Prosecutor Refuses to Seek Death Penalty for Alleged Cop 
Killer, Defies Gov. Rick Scott’s Order to Step Aside, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2017, 4:50 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/03/21/floridas-first-black-
prosecutor-a-death-penalty-boycotter-defies-gov-rick-scott/ [perma.cc/gyf4-ghxt]; Bill 
Rankin, Fulton DA, Two Challengers Commit to Not Seeking the Death Penalty, ATLANTA J.-
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opposes capital punishment, but a local majority cannot override a statewide 
majority on the moral propriety of the death penalty. A categorical 
declination policy based on moral grounds allows a local majority to override 
a statewide majority on the legal force of the state statute. That is not a 
question the state grants to the local polity.143 
CONCLUSION 
There is no single answer to the proper scope of the prosecutor’s 
declination policy. Prosecutors in the United States differ.144 The separation 
of powers doctrine is relevant when setting the boundary, as are the various 
sources of law that mark the prosecutor’s competing duties to state and local 
polities. 
Particular bodies of law and legal practices define the prosecutor’s 
competing loyalties to the statewide and local polities. The relevant 
indicators include appropriations of public funds for prosecutor positions and 
court operations, the legislative history and typical uses of the criminal 
statute or ordinance the prosecutor might enforce, distinctive local effects of 
crime and enforcement patterns, home rule provisions in state statutes and 
constitutions, and the statutory authority of state-level offices (the governor 
or the state attorney general) to file or take control of criminal cases without 
an invitation from the local elected prosecutor. 
At the same time, the proper scope of declination authority does not vary 
individually from prosecutor to prosecutor. The proper limits apply to each 
prosecutor’s office as a whole. They are based on legal characteristics of the 
office, conditions in the local community, and the relevant categories of cases 
rather than individual preferences of the chief prosecutor or the line 
prosecutors. 
The views of local voters can expand the legitimate range of a 
prosecutor’s declination policy, but only if state law allows room for local 
views. In most jurisdictions, state law does leave an opening for local input 
to guide the prosecutor’s choice of charges. Expansive criminal codes, 
limited state funding for prosecutors, and the influence of local contributions 
to prosecutor and court funding produce a scheme in which both levels of 
 
CONST. (May 28, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/fulton-two-challengers-commit-not
-seeking-the-death-penalty/7sfZRVL5ngc3eRf9Xo2MgJ/ [perma.cc/h5fd-dnwe]. 
 143 In Ayala v. Scott, 224 So. 3d 755, 758–59 (Fla. 2017), the court reached the correct 
outcome for overly broad reasons, namely, that refusals to enforce the death penalty apart from 
case-by-case determinations fall outside the traditional bounds of prosecutorial discretion. 
 144 See Ronald F. Wright, Kay L. Levine, & Marc L. Miller, The Many Faces of 
Prosecution, 1 STAN. J. CRIM. L. & POL’Y 27, 34–37 (2015) (reviewing empirical studies 
documenting structural differences in prosecutor offices). 
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government matter. As a result, different charging priorities take shape for 
various local offices. 
State law can direct the prosecutor to ignore the wishes of local voters 
in limited circumstances: those few sections of the criminal code that express 
the core moral values of statewide voters, where limited resources do not 
provide a basis to redirect such cases to the back of the line. These situations 
are rare. Far more often, the best practice for a prosecutor is to listen to both 
state and local polities and to set local charging policies that account for the 
legitimate input of both. 
 
